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ABSTRACT
Mobile payment has drawn considerable attention due to its
convenience of paying via personal mobile devices at any-
time and anywhere, and passcodes (i.e., PINs) are the ﬁrst
choice of most consumers to authorize the payment. This
work demonstrates a serious security breach and aims to
raise the awareness of the public that the passcodes for au-
thorizing transactions in mobile payments can be leaked
by exploiting the embedded sensors in wearable devices
(e.g., smartwatches). We present a passcode inference sys-
tem, which examines to what extent the user’s PIN during
mobile payment could be revealed from a single wrist-worn
wearable device under diﬀerent input scenarios involving
either two hands or a single hand. Extensive experiments
with 15 volunteers demonstrate that an adversary is able to
recover a user’s PIN with high success rate within 5 tries
under various input scenarios.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the prevalent use of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones),
mobile payments become increasingly attractive because
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Figure 1: Representative passcode input scenarios.
they allow users to perform near real-time transactions any-
time and anywhere conveniently. Users can easily use their
digital wallets for in-store payments, make online purchases
via in-app payments, and perform money transfer between
two accounts using mobile money transfer. Thus, mobile
payments bring users complete freedom from the shackles
of currency and credit cards in transactions.
The extreme convenient utility of mobile payments also
makes it an attractive target for adversaries. The passcode
of the user is the ﬁrst line of defense preventing the mali-
cious use of mobile payments. Recent study demonstrates
that motion sensors embedded in the increasingly popular
wearable devices (e.g., smartwatches and ﬁtness trackers)
possess a more severe threat [3]. Toward this end, we pro-
pose a passcode inference system, to investigate to what ex-
tent the wearable’s sensing data can reveal a user’s mobile
payment passcode when the user is operating on a small-
sized smartphone screen with the consideration of diﬀerent
hand input scenarios (e.g., using two hands or single hand
as illustrated in Figure 1)
The passcode input scenarios can be classiﬁed into two
categories, namely two-hand and one-hand, based on which
hand the user holds the mobile device and wears the wear-
able during the mobile payment process. In the two-hand
scenarios, the user usually has the mobile device and wear-
able on two diﬀerent hands when inputting PINs (i.e., Fig-
ure 1(a)). Whereas in the one-hand scenarios, the user uses
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the same single hand to wear the wearable and hold the mo-
bile device (i.e., Figure 1(b)). Furthermore, when the wear-
able is on the input hand (i.e., dominant hand), the key tap-
ping dynamics become weaker, which only involve thumb
movements (as shown in the left ﬁgure of Figure 1(b));When
the wearable is on the non-input hand (i.e., non-dominant
hand), it is even harder to capture the motion of the in-
put hand because the wearable device is on the opposite
wrist as depicted in the right ﬁgure of Figure 1(b). Recent
studies [1, 2] show the possibility of classifying single keys
on smartphone screen via smartwatch inertial sensing and
smartphone touch events. The achieved classiﬁcation accu-
racy is similar to those directly using smartphone sensors.
However, the attacker’s capability of revealing the com-
plete passcodes under diﬀerent hand-input scenarios via the
wearables remains unclear. In this work, we perform a com-
prehensive study to explore the possibility of revealing the
passcodes under all of the aforementioned hand-input sce-
narios. We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We develop a system to explore the possibility of reveal-
ing the user’s private information (e.g., passcode entered
on smartphones) via wrist-worn wearables during themo-
bile payment process under various hand-input ways.
• We develop the training-free Euclidean distance-based
model and the parallel PIN inference algorithms that can
infer the user’s PIN entries in the two-hand scenarios.
• The proposed system extracts unique features over the
time duration of each tap in the one-hand scenarios. The
multi-dimensional features in time series canwell capture
the weak wrist vibrations in response to PIN entries and
classify taps accurately.
2 SYSTEM DESIGN
Figure 2 shows the ﬂow of our system, which consists of
two major building blocks: 1) Devices on Two Hands utilizes
the sensor data to track ﬁne-grained hand movement tra-
jectories and infers users’ passcodes when the mobile and
the wearable devices are on two diﬀerent hands; 2) Devices
on a Single Hand identiﬁes users’ passcode entries when
the devices are on the same hand. We note that the pro-
posed system ﬁrst determines victims’ input scenarios (i.e.,
two-hand or one-hand) and then picks the corresponding
building block to infer the victims’ passcodes. Speciﬁcally,
the system exploits the quaternions from the victims’ mo-
bile and wearable devices to determine the spatial relation-
ships between the two devices and utilizes a threshold-based
method to determine the input scenario.
2.1 Devices on Two Hands
After obtaining the motion sensor readings (e.g., Accelera-
tion, Quaternion) from the wearable device, the system ﬁrst
performs the Noise Reduction and Coordinate Alignment. It
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Figure 2: Mobile payment passcode inference frame-
work.
removes high-frequency noises from the raw sensor read-
ings and exploits quaternion measurements to align the co-
ordinates of the two free-axis devices. Thus, the hand dy-
namics captured by the wearable sensors are translated to
the movements on the on-screen keypad for PIN inference.
Then the Point-to-point Segmentation examines the trans-
lated acceleration to determine the point-to-point segments
by detecting the key taps of a PIN entry based on diﬀer-
ential Z acceleration. Next, the Fine-grained Point-to-point
Reconstruction estimates the distance and direction of the
handmovement in each segment and reconstructs the point-
to-point trajectory. A point-to-point trajectory reﬂects the
hand movement between two consecutive key taps. For
inferring passcode entries, the system builds a Euclidean-
distance based model to describe the practical geometric re-
lationships between real keys. The Parallel PIN Decoding Al-
gorithm is designed to integrate the point-to-point trajecto-
ries in the model and search for the most likely PIN. Note
that the decoding starts from all possible starting keys/dots
in parallel and our algorithms only do add-and-compare op-
erations, which greatly reduce the computational cost.
2.2 Devices on a Single Hand
Diﬀerent from the two-hand scenarios, it is hard to recover
the hand movement trajectory of the input hand if both the
phone and the wearable are on the input hand. Moreover, it
is even harder to capture the dynamics of the input hand if
the wearable is on the non-input hand. We resort to capture
the minute wrist movement diﬀerences that result from the
various ﬁnger tapping positions on the on-screen keypad to
recognize each tapped key. When the two devices are on
the input hand, the movement of the thumb during tapping
can be passed by the tendon to cause minute wrist move-
ment.When the two devices are both on the non-input hand,
the key tap on the phone causes vibrations on the phone,
which are passed down to vibrate the wrist slightly. The
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Figure 3: Performance of parallel PIN decoding in the
two-hand scenarios.
system utilizes a machine learning-based method to clas-
sify the tapping positions based on the unique vibration fea-
tures. In particular, after obtaining the raw sensor data from
the wearable, our system ﬁrst performs Key Tap Detection
Using Diﬀerential Acceleration Z to detect tapping actions
based on diﬀerential accelerationZ and extract the data seg-
ment within a short time around each tap. Then the system
further divides each tap segment into small pieces and ex-
tracts unique features in time series from both the coordi-
nate aligned and non-aligned sensor data. The non-aligned
sensor data (e.g., acceleration and gyroscope readings) de-
scribes the movement of the wearable itself and the aligned
sensor data (e.g., accelerations aligned with the mobile de-
vice coordinate) shows the relative position change between
the wearable and the smartphone. Based on the unique fea-
tures, a machine learning-based classiﬁer is proposed to rec-
ognize ﬁnger taps as each key to infer a complete PIN.
3 PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate the system, we ask our volunteers to enter pass-
codes on the on-screen keypad of multiple smartphones in-
cluding Google Nexus one, Nexus 6P, Samsung Note 4 and
Note 3 while wearing a smartwatch LG W150. When the
volunteers enter passcodes, the smartwatch collects acceler-
ation and quaternion readings under 100 samples/sec and
sends the sensor data to a nearby server via Bluetooth.
We conduct experiments covering three passcode input
scenarios as shown in Figure 1. We provide the participants
with PINs from a pool, which is designed to include most dif-
ﬁculty levels of recovering the hand movement trajectories.
The participants are asked to be familiar with their chosen
ones before collecting data. Particularly, 20 distinct 4-digit
PIN combinations are collected from 15 volunteers. In total,
1200 entered passcodes are collected.
TwoHands: PIN Inference. Figure 3(a) shows the top-k
success rate of inferring PINs on the on-screen keypad with
and without “Enter” key.We ﬁnd that our system eﬀectively
reveals both types of PIN entries. In particular, by choosing
the top-1 PIN candidate, our system achieves over 67% suc-
cess rate for the PINs with an “Enter”, while the success rate
is about 60% for the PINs without an “Enter”. Furthermore,
the success rate to reveal the two types of PINs increases if
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Figure 4: 4-digit PIN decoding accuracy in the one-
hand scenarios.
the adversary utilizes more candidates from the top-k can-
didate list. Speciﬁcally, 92% success rate is achieved to in-
fer the PINs with an “Enter” by using the top-5 candidates.
And the success rate for the PIN without an “Enter” is 84%.
This indicates that the adversary can break the user’s en-
tered PINs with high probability within limited tries. Be-
sides, we also ﬁnd that the success rate of inferring the PINs
with an “Enter” has higher accuracy. The reason is that the
last tapped position of the PIN is ﬁxed at the “Enter” key,
which enables our parallel PIN decoding algorithm to start
from one ﬁxed key without guess.
Single Hand: Revealing PINs. We then evaluate the
top-k success rate of inferring the user’s complete PINs in
the single-hand scenarios. Figure 4 shows the PIN inference
accuracy for both single-hand scenarios. Speciﬁcally, when
the adversary only tries once, the success rates are around
21% and 30% for the input hand and the non-input hand
scenarios respectively. Within ﬁve tries, the attacker can
achieve around 50% for the single input hand and 59% suc-
cess rates for the non-input hand, which is a non-negligible
security breach. Moreover, if the adversary can try 15 times,
over 70% and 78% accuracies can be achieved for the single
input hand and the single non-input hand scenarios, respec-
tively. The results show that the wearable can capture the
minute wrist motions in both single hand scenarios to accu-
rately reveal a user’s PIN on mobile devices.
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